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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED-WAIVER OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL: THE NORTH
DAKOTA SUPREME COURT RULES THAT A KNOWING AND
INTELLIGENT WAIVER REQUIRES AWARENESS OF DANGERS
AND DISADVANTAGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
State v. Wicks, 1998 N.D. 76, 576 N.W.2d 518
I.

FACTS

In 1996, Johannah Wicks was living with her boyfriend, Kelly Overby, a convicted drug felon. 1 During a March 29, 1996, probation search
of Overby's residence, Morton County Deputy Brent Slade found a
"snow seal," which is a folded piece of paper used to carry powdered
drugs, in a pair of blue jeans in the bathroom. 2 Slade gave the snow seal,
which contained a powdered substance, to the designated evidence custodian, Burleigh County Deputy Trent Wangen, who believed the powdered substance was methamphetamine. 3 Deputy Wangen asked Wicks if
she wanted to talk about the powdered substance, to which Wicks responded, "It is mine." 4 The North Dakota State Laboratory determined
the substance was indeed methamphetamine, 5 and Wicks was charged on
December 13, 1996, with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class C
felony under section 19-03.1-23(6) of the North Dakota Century Code. 6
On December 20, 1996, Wicks completed an application for appointed defense Services; based on the application, the court found her
1.State v. Wicks, 1998 N.D. 76, 2, 576 N.W.2d 518, 519.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.13.
5. Id.
6. Id. Section 19-03.1-23(6) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
It is unlawful for any person to willfully, as defined in section 12.1-02-02, [to] possess a
controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of the
practitioner's professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter,
but any person who violates section 12-46-24 or 12-47-21 may not be prosecuted under
this subsection. Except as provided in this subsection, any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class C felony. If the person is in or on, or within one thousand feet
[300.48 meters] of the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school or a public vocational school, the person is guilty of a class B felony. Any
person who violates this subsection regarding possession of one-half ounce [14.175
grams] to one ounce [28.35 grams] of marijuana is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Any person, except a person operating a motor vehicle, who violates this subsection
regarding possession of less than one-half ounce [14.175 grams] of marijuana is guilty of
a class B misdemeanor. Any person who violates this subsection regarding possession of
less than one-half ounce [14.175 grams] of marijuana while operating a motor vehicle is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(6) (1997).
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to be indigent and appointed Robert Martin to be her attorney. 7 A few
days before trial, Wicks filed a disciplinary complaint against Martin with
the disciplinary board of the supreme court. 8 Wicks believed that such a
complaint would preserve a record for a later claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 9
On June 3, 1997, Martin advised the trial court that he had learned
that Wicks had filed a disciplinary action against him, causing him to
request leave to withdraw as her attorney.' 0 Wicks expressed a desire to
proceed but thought that Martin would be representing her.1 1 Wicks
insisted she had no idea the filing of a disciplinary complaint would
result in Martin's withdrawal. 12 Wicks remarked, "I didn't know that.
They didn't tell me that. I was told for a point of appeal I should have
on the record that I was dissatisfied because there was no motions filed.
And I had asked him to file motions." 13 The court asked if her "drugger" boyfriend (referring to Kelly Overby) was giving her legal
advice.' 4 Wicks admitted he had given her some advice. 15 Describing
the episode as an "absolutely ridiculous" situation Wicks brought on
herself, the district court allowed Martin to withdraw. 16 In doing so, the
court advised Wicks that she would have to represent herself.17 Wicks, in
apparent disbelief asked, "I am going to have to represent myself? I
don't have a clue on what to do, I am going to be found guilty"; to
which, the court replied, "That's probably very likely."18
7. Brief for Appellant at 1, State v. Wicks, 1998 N.D. 76, 576 N.W.2d 518 (No. 970259). Wicks
attempted to retain another attorney from Jamestown, North Dakota, but the Jamestown attorney told
Wicks he did not have enough time to prepare the case and told her to stay with Martin. Wicks, 4,
576 N.W.2d at 519.
8. Wicks, 5, 576 N.W.2d at 519. Wicks had indicated that she wanted to file a motion to suppress evidence but had never discussed this with Martin. Brief for Appellee at 4, State v. Wicks, 1998
N.D. 76, 576 N.W.2d 518 (No. 970259). The record did not indicate whether Wicks had ever
attempted to contact Martin, but Martin had advised Wicks that the deadline for filing such motions
had passed. Id.
9. Wicks, 5, 576 N.W.2d at 519.
10. Id. Wicks claimed that she did not understand that filing the disciplinary complaint against
Martin would make Martin withdraw. Id.; see also Brief for Appellee at 4, Wicks (No. 970259).
After Martin moved to withdraw, the State objected to any delay in the trial:
Your honor, the defendant has been ... trying to get this matter delayed, continued,
however you want to put it. This was simply another action of her part to do that. The
State has our witnesses here, the jury is here, and the defendant has put herself in this
position... [S]he obviously knew this might happen. She attempted to retain counsel ....
Wicks, 6, 576 N.W.2d at 519.
11. Wicks, 7, 576 N.W.2d at 520.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. 8.
15. Id.
16. Id. 9.
17. Id.
18. Id.1110-11.
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In light of the fact that Wicks was representing herself, the State
9
asked to be allowed to negotiate a plea agreement with her. 1 After ten
20
It
agreement.
minutes of negotiation, the parties failed to reach a plea
appears that Wicks and the State discussed the issue of a jury trial,
because once the record resumed, Wicks was asked if she wished to waive
her right to a jury trial. 2 1 The court asked Wicks what she wanted to do,
22
to which Wicks responded, "[t]o waive the jury trial."
After a bench trial lasting less than twenty-five minutes, the district
court concluded that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and convicted Wicks on the charge of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine. 2 3 On August 1, 1997, Wicks was sentenced to three years of commitment to the North Dakota Department of
24
Corrections, with two years suspended.
On appeal, Wicks argued ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of
her right to counsel, and abuse of discretion based on the district court's
failure to grant a continuance. 2 5 In considering whether Wicks was
denied her right to counsel when the district court excused her appointed
counsel on the day of the trial, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that the trial court denied Wicks her right to counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I,
26
section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that in all criminal prosecutions, "the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 27 The United States
Supreme Court originally construed this provision to mean that in
federal courts, counsel must be provided for defendants unable to
employ counsel unless the defendant competently and intelligently
waived that right.28 Between Powell v. Alabama29 in 1932 and Gideon v.
19. Id. 12.
20. Id.
21. Id. Wicks had attempted to discuss the waiver with her Jamestown attorney, but the attorney
had left the office. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. 13.
24. Id. 14.
25. Id. 15.
26. Id. 29, 576 N.W.2d at 522.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). See generally Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
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Wainwright30 in 1963, the United States Supreme Court struggled with
the question of whether the federal constitutional right to counsel was to
be made obligatory upon the states by the due process clause of the
31
Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The Pre-Gideon Approach to the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel
In Powell v. Alabama, the defendants, seven blacks charged with the
rape of two white girls, were found guilty and sentenced to death in an
Alabama state court.32 The defendants were found to be ignorant and
illiterate, and they were all residents of other states. 3 3 None of the
defendants was allowed the opportunity to employ counsel or to com34
municate with relatives who might assist in finding counsel for him.
The Supreme Court held that the defendants were denied the right
to counsel and a fair trial.35 In reaching this decision, the Court stated
that the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative to the procurement of a fair trial that the failure on the part of the trial court to make
an effective appointment of counsel was a denial of due process within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 The Court therefore
established that in a capital case in which the defendant is unable to
employ counsel and is incapable of adequately making his or her own
defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, or illiteracy, 37 it is the
276, 310 (1930) (stating that when there is no constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy
prohibiting it, an accused may waive any privilege which he or she is given the right to enjoy).
29. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963).
32. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1932). Under the Alabama rape statute, the jury,
which determined the punishment for rape, could impose a sentence ranging from 10 years imprisonment to death. Id. at 50.
33. Id. at 52.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id. at 71. The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution in relevant part provides that:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The Court wrote:
[E]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he not be guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If
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duty of the trial court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for
38
him or her as a necessary requisite of due process of the law.
However, the Court unambiguously stated that it was not holding
that appointment of counsel by the trial court was a necessary requisite
39
of due process in all criminal prosecutions or under all circumstances.
Rather the Court carefully tailored its opinion around the surrounding
circumstances and limited the obligations of state courts to appoint
40
counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases.
In Johnson v. Zerbst,4 1 the Court dealt with a criminal case in
federal court in which the accused pled not guilty, stated that he had no
lawyer, and, upon an inquiry by the trial court, stated that he was ready
43
for trial. 42 He was subsequently convicted of possessing and uttering
counterfeit money.44 In reversing the conviction, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty unless the accused has waived the right to assistance of counsel. 45
The Court defined "waiver" as an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right to counsel which must depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. 4 6 The Court further
that fact be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal
court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing
for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a
hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.
Id.
38. Id. at 71.
39. Id.at 70.
40. Id.at 71; see also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 59-60 (1963) (holding that since a
preliminary hearing is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding, presence of counsel was required for
defendant facing the death penalty); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (holding that denial
of right to counsel to defendant charged with capital crime violated due process because the Powell
decision required counsel at all stages of a capital case and, since arraignment is a critical stage in the
criminal process in Alabama, failure to have counsel at this stage violated defendant's constitutional
rights); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948) (finding that while capital cases require
appointment of counsel, whether the 14th Amendment requires state trial courts to appoint counsel to
procure a fair trial in other cases depends on the facts of each case); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640,
648 (1948) (recognizing that had the charges been capital charges, the trial court would have been
required, both by state statute and the decision of the Court interpreting the 14th Amendment, to
appoint counsel); Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 487 (1945) (citing Powell, stating that, at least in
capital cases, appointment of counsel is a necessary requisite of due process of law); Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945) (citing Powell's statement that, at least in capital cases, appointment
of counsel is a necessary requisite of due process of law).
41. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
42. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 460 (1938). The defendant contended on appeal that he was
ignorant of his right to counsel and incapable of preserving his legal and constitutional rights during
trial. Id. at 467.
43. To "utter" counterfeit money means to put or send in circulation an instrument and declare or
assert, directly or indirectly, that it is good or genuine. BLACK'S LAW Dic'nONARY 1547 (6th ed. 1990).
44. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 460.
45. Id. at 463.
46. Id. at 464. For subsequent Supreme Court cases supporting the waiver standard see generally
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held that the trial court has the responsibility, consistent with the standard
set forth, of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver of the right to counsel by the accused. 47 Therefore, the Court
held that while an accused may waive the right to counsel, 48 whether
there is a proper waiver should be determined by the trial court and that
49
determination should appear on the record.
The Court in Zerbst therefore declared that the jurisdiction of the
federal trial court to convict and sentence is dependent upon its compli50
ance with the Sixth Amendment guaranty of assistance of counsel.
The trial court's ability to adjudicate a case may be lost if it fails to provide counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel but has not
intelligently waived his or her right. 5 1 Thus, under Zerbst, if the trial
court fails to comply with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, it
can no longer proceed with the trial and any subsequent conviction of
the accused is void. 52
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (finding that a defendant's ability to represent himself has no
bearing upon his competence to waive his right to counsel and choose self-representation); Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (determining that waiver must reflect an intentional abandonment of a
known right made with open eyes); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (concluding that a waiver
decision must be voluntary in the sense that it is the product of a free and deliberate choice and the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right and the consequences of the decision to waive that right); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (determining that
waiver must be knowing and intelligent); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding that a
decision to waive counsel must be voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and understanding); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (determining that a waiver decision must be knowing and intelligent);
Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972) (concluding that a decision to waive counsel must be voluntary and
knowing); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding that a decision to waive counsel must be
intelligent and understanding); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (determining that a decision to
waive counsel must be intelligent and understanding); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954)
(holding that a waiver of counsel in federal trials must be competently and intelligently made); Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (holding that a decision to waive counsel must be voluntary, competent,
and understanding); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (concluding that a waiver must be an
intelligent and conscious choice); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (concluding that a decision to
waive counsel must be intelligent and understanding); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942)
(allowing waiver of the right to counsel if the accused's decision is made intelligently and competently
with open eyes); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (setting aside a guilty plea made without
assistance of counsel because the defendant's waiver of right to counsel was not voluntary).
47. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
48. The Court pointed out that trial courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that acquiescence in the loss of constitutional rights
should not be presumed by the courts. Id. at 464.
49. Id. at 465.
50. Id. at 468.
51. Id. The Court stated:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime, to the
assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential
jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life
or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a
necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If
the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not competently and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional
bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.
Id. at 467-68.
52. Id. at 468; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 (1962) (stating that the principles
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In Betts v. Brady,53 the Supreme Court heard the appeal of a
defendant, convicted in Maryland state court, who was unable to employ
counsel due to lack of funds. 54 When he requested that counsel be appointed for him, the trial judge refused, stating that it was the practice of
the county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants only for murder
and rape prosecutions.55
The defendant appealed his subsequent conviction to the United
States Supreme Court, which affirmed. 5 6 The Court held that the Sixth
Amendment applied only to trials in federal courts and that the specific
guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment are not made obligatory
upon the states through incorporation by the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. 5 7
The Court did, however, state that a denial by states of rights or
privileges embodied in the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, operate to deprive a litigant of due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but such a denial must be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of facts on a case-by-case basis. 58 The Court
reasoned that to deduce from the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment a rule binding upon the states in all circumstances would
impose a "requirement without distinction" between criminal charges
of differing magnitudes upon all courts, despite variations in their
jurisdiction. 5 9
Rather than deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment made the
right to counsel guarantees of the Sixth Amendment obligatory upon the
states, the Court formulated a case-by-case approach by which the
Fourteenth Amendment is to be used as a prohibition against convictions
that are offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
declared in Johnson v. Zerbst are equally applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in state
criminal proceedings); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 720-24 (1948) (stating that in order for a
waiver to be valid, such waiver must be made with a broad understanding of the whole matter, and
that the defendant in this case did not have such an understanding); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1942) (allowing waiver of the right to counsel if the accused knows
what he or she is doing and the choice is made with open eyes).
53. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
54. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,456-57 (1942).
55. Id. at 457. The defendant was indicted for robbery in the Circuit Court of Carroll County,
Maryland. Id. at 456.
56. Id. at 473.
57. Id. at 461-62.
58. Id. at 462.
59. Id. at 473. The Court reasoned that a situation that may constitute a denial of fundamental
fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice, may in other circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations, fall short of a denial of fundamental fairness. Id. Hence, the Court believed that the
incorporation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel upon the states through the 14th Amendment posed
the danger of falling into the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules, which
ignore qualifying factors that should be taken into account in each case. Id. at 462. Therefore, the
Court believed that a "less rigid and more fluid" approach was necessary for dealing with the 14th
Amendment's due process guarantee. Id.
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right.6 0 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that in light of the
common law practice, as well as current state constitutional and statutory
provisions dealing with the right to counsel, it has been the judgment of
the people, their representatives, and their courts that appointment of
counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. 6 1 The Court
also found that the legislature may determine when and to what extent a
defendant had a right to appointment of counsel. 6 2
Therefore, in the light of the evidence, the Court was unable to say
that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the states to furnish counsel in every case. 63 Rather,
courts have the power to appoint counsel when such an appointment
seems to be required in the interest of fairness. 64 Finally, the Court was
quick to point out that the Fourteenth Amendment is not an "inexorable
command," by which no trial of any offense, or in any court, can be
60. Id. For cases demonstrating circumstances that necessitated the need for assistance of counsel to procure a fair trial in non-capital cases, see generally Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957)
(holding that the youth, immaturity and limited education of the defendant as well as the complexity of
the charge necessitated assistance of counsel); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116
(1956) (holding that the defendant's youth and immaturity and the technicality of the crime charged
necessitated assistance of counsel); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) (finding that insanity or
mental abnormality of defendant necessitated assistance of counsel); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773
(1949) (stating that a fair trial test necessitates an appraisal before and during the trial of the facts of
each case to determine whether the need for counsel is so great that the deprivation of the right to
counsel works a fundamental unfairness); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (holding that
where the gravity of the crime and other factors such as the age and education of the defendant render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice as to be fundamentally unfair,
assistance of counsel, absent a valid waiver, is required under the 14th Amendment); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (determining that an unrepresented defendant was overreached by the
prosecutor's submission of misinformation to the court or was prejudiced by the court's questionable
misreading of record); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (holding that youth and immaturity
necessitated assistance of counsel).
61. Betts, 316 U.S. at 464-72. The Court analyzed the relevant data on the subject afforded by
constitutional and statutory provisions in the colonies and states prior to the inclusion of the Bill of
Rights as well as the current constitutional, statutory, and judicial history of the states to determine
whether the right to counsel was a right fundamental to a fair trial. Id. at 465-67. The Court found
that, in light of the common law practice, it was evident that the constitutional provisions in state
constitutions to the effect that a defendant should be "allowed" counsel or should have a right "to be
heard by himself and his counsel," or that a defendant might be heard by either or both, at his or her
election, were intended to do away with the rules which denied representation by counsel in criminal
prosecutions. Id. at 466. However, the Court did not believe that either the common law or the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel provision, in light of the statutory and constitutional protections provided
by the individual states, were aimed to compel the state to provide counsel for the defendant in all
criminal prosecutions. Id.
62. Id. at 471. The Court found that statutes in force in the original 13 states at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights revealed that the matter of appointment of counsel for defendants was
dealt with by statute rather than by constitutional provision. Id. at 467. The Court also found that the
contemporary legislation of the states exhibited a great deal of diversity of policy. Id. The Court
reasoned that because states dealt with the issue of appointment of counsel in a variety of ways, from
constitutional provisions to legislative regulation, it was up to the judgment of the people and their legislatures to determine when a defendant had the right to appointed counsel in criminal trials. Id. at 471.
63. Id. at 464-72.
64. Id.
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fairly conducted and justice afforded if the defendant is not represented
65
by counsel.
2.

Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel GuaranteeMade
Obligatory Upon the United States: Gideon v. Wainwright

In Gideon v. Wainwright,66 the petitioner was charged with breaking
and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under
Florida state law. 6 7 The petitioner asked the court to appoint counsel,
and the court denied the request because, under Florida law, it could
only appoint counsel in capital cases. 68 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari asking counsel whether "this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady
69
[should] be reconsidered?"
In reconsidering Betts, the Court accepted the assumption, which it
made in Betts, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 0 However, the Court disagreed with the Betts
Court's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is
not one of those fundamental rights. 7 1 The Court further stated that the
decision in Betts represented an abrupt break with well-considered
precedents. 72
65. Id. at 473. In his dissent, Justice Black stated that it was his belief that the 14th Amendment
made the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states. See id. at 473-77 (Black, J., dissenting); see also
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780-82. (1949) (stating that the Constitution does not guarantee every
person charged with a serious crime in a state court the right of assistance of counsel regardless of the
circumstances). However, where the ignorance, youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a
trial without counsel unfair, the defendant was deprived of his liberty contrary to the 14th Amendment
if he or she went to trial without counsel. Gibbs, 337 U.S. at 780-82.
66. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1963).
68. Id.at 337.
69. Id. at 338.
70. Id. at 342.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 343-44. The Court found that 10 years before its Betts decision, it had declared that
"the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character." Id. at 342-43 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932)). The Court cited other cases in which the Court itself discussed the
fundamental nature of the right to counsel to a fair trial. Id. at 343. For example, the Court cited
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936), which stated: "We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were also
safeguarded against state action by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, and among them
the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution." Gideon, 372
U.S. at 343. The Court also quoted Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938), which stated: "The
assistance of counsel is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed essential to insure
fundamental human rights of life and liberty. The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition
that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not still be done." Gideon, 372 U.S.
at 343 (citing Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940)).
Therefore, given the Court's prior precedents, Justice Black found the conclusion that the right to
counsel is of a fundamental nature to be unmistakable. Id.
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In restoring the established constitutional principles promulgated to
achieve a fair system of justice, the Court stated that reason and reflection demand recognition that in the adversary system of justice, any
person who is haled into court and who is too poor to hire a lawyer
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him or her.7 3
Therefore, in finding that previous precedents established the fundamental nature of the right to counsel to a fair trial, the Court overruled the
decision it had previously reached in Betts. 74 The Court declared that
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel in all criminal prosecutions was made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment
and that indigent defendants, like Gideon, in state criminal prosecutions
75
have the right to have counsel appointed.
73. Id. at 344. Justice Black reasoned further that:
[G]overnments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly,
there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money to hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very
beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot
be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him.
Id.
74. Id. at 339.
75. Id. at 339-40, 342 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25, 326 (1937)); see
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-83 (1984) (defining the role of the stand-by counsel and imposing two limits on stand-by counsel's unsolicited participation: 1) the defendant must be entitled to
preserve actual control over the case presented to the jury and 2) stand-by counsel's participation
must not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he or she was represented by counsel at trial); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74
(1979) (adopting actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of
counsel and holding that the Sixth and 14th Amendments require only that no indigent criminal
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him or her the right to
the assistance of appointed counsel in his or her defense, thereby modifying the Argersinger possible
imprisonment rule); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (holding, as a corollary to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, that the defendant also has a right to self-representation if the defendant
knowingly and intelligently elects to proceed pro se); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972)
(holding that the right to counsel attaches at or after initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, or arraignment); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-40 (1967) (construing the Sixth Amendment guarantee to assistance
of counsel to apply to critical stages of the proceedings). In Wade, the Court stated that in addition to
counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he or she not stand alone against the state at
any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in or out of court, when counsel's absence might
derogate the accused's right to a fair trial. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-40. But see Faretta,422 U.S. at 834
n.46 (recognizing that a defendant's right to self-representation is not a license to abuse dignity of the
courtroom and that the court may appoint "stand-by counsel" to aid the accused); Gilbert v. California,
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However, in an effort to draw a line defining the constitutional right
to appointment of counsel, the United States Supreme Court would
subsequently hold in Scott v. Illinois7 6 that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require only that no indigent criminal defendant be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him or
77
her the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his or her defense.
In addition, the Court modified its prior holding in Argersinger v.
Hamlin,7 8 in which the Court had held that an indigent criminal defendant had the right to appointed counsel if he or she faced the possibility
of imprisonment, 79 by holding that actual imprisonment was the line
defining when an indigent criminal defendant must be afforded assis80
tance of appointed counsel.
B.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER NORTH
DAKOTA LAW

Article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution provides that
in criminal prosecutions, "the party accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and with counsel." 8 1 This language differs
from the Sixth Amendment, which provides "[tihe accused shall enjoy
82
the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (finding that the taking of handwriting samples was not a critical stage of the
criminal proceeding, hence defendant was not entitled to assistance of counsel). For a perspective on
the Sixth Amendment and a historical analysis of developments in the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, see ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIxTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE (1992). For an overview of the accused's right to counsel, see generally 21 AM.
JUR. 2d CriminalLaw §§ 732-763, 976-992, 1185-1241 (1998).
76. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
77. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979).
78. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
79. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
80. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74. In Scott, the defendant was charged with shoplifting, which had a
maximum penalty of one year in jail, a $500 fine, or both. Id. at 368. The defendant, an indigent, was
fined $50 for his offense, but he argued that the holding of Argersinger required the state to provide
counsel whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty. Id. The Court rejected this argument by
stating that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment. Id. at 373. Therefore, the Court held that the right to counsel only requires that no indigent
criminal defendant may actually be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless he or she has counsel
appointed for his or her defense. Id. at 374.
81. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 12. For statutory provisions granting North Dakota citizens the right to
counsel, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-26(2) (1997) (stating that counsel will be appointed to individuals who lack sufficient resources to retain counsel in a proceeding for modification or termination
of an order of commitment to a treatment facility initiated by the individual in which the status of that
individual may be adversely affected); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (Supp. 1999) (granting juveniles
the right to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceeding and, if a needy person unable to employ counsel, the court will provide counsel); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-06 (1997) (granting
specific rights to defendants in all criminal prosecutions, including the right to appear and defend in
person and with counsel); see also N.D. R. C RiM. P. 44 (1999) (stating that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, every indigent defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense" and
granting a defendant who is unable to employ counsel a court appointed attorney at the defendant's
expense).
82. See State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177 (N.D. 1985).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court has traditionally recognized that
the right to counsel is a right fundamental to a fair trial. 83 Consequently,
section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution has been viewed with special
regard to its intrinsic value, exercised independently of any compulsion
84
under federal law or the federal constitution.
Thus, it has long been held in North Dakota that in the absence of
an effective waiver of the right to counsel, freely and voluntarily made,
lack of counsel will render a judgment null and void and requires
reversal and remand for a new trial. 85 In order for a waiver of counsel to
be valid, the court has stated that there must be both the capacity to make
an understanding choice and an absence of subverting factors so that the
choice is clearly free and responsible. 86 The question of whether an accused has freely and understandingly waived his or her right to counsel
is one of fact. 87 Therefore, a waiver of the right to counsel cannot be
presumed from a silent record. 88 Rather, the record must show, or there
must be evidence which shows, that an accused was offered counsel but
89
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
83. Id. at 178; see also State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242, 247 (N.D. 1970) (citing legislative expressions that set forth the minimum standard to be followed in order to afford a defendant his right to
counsel); State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857, 861 (N.D. 1962) (citing legislative expressions that set
forth the minimum standard to be followed in order to afford a defendant his right to counsel); State v.
Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599, 607 (N.D. 1954) (declaring that the North Dakota Constitution guarantees
one accused of crime the right to appear and defend in person and with counsel).
84. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 176-78. Justice Levine, writing for the majority, explained further that
Explanatory Note to Rule 44 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stated that counsel would be appointed only when required under the holding of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972), did not indicate any intention that in North Dakota the right to counsel guaranteed by section
12 was to be limited by or to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, since there was no evidence in the minutes of the Rules Committee or otherwise to demonstrate such an intent. Id. at 178 n.6.
Justice Levine stated further that there is no such analogous policy or practice stated with regard to the
relationship between the Sixth Amendment and section 12. Id. Further, as Justice Levine subsequently
pointed out, the North Dakota Supreme Court has often recognized that the North Dakota constitution
may afford broader rights than those granted under the federal constitution. Id. (citing City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1984); California v. Ramos, 459 U.S. 1301 (1982) (holding
that states are free to provide greater protection in their criminal justice system than federal constitution requires)). But see Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 180-81 (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially) (concurring in the result but stating that the court should reserve for another day whether Article I, section 12
provides greater protection than the Sixth Amendment).
85. See State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 469 (N.D. 1986) (citing Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 178);
Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 178 (concluding that uncounseled convictions are too unreliable to support the
sanction of imprisonment); State v. McKay, 234 N.W.2d 853, 856 (N.D. 1975) (holding that lack of
counsel will render a judgment void and require reversal of conviction); State v. Magrum, 38 N.W.2d
358, 360 (N.D. 1949) (finding that failure to provide an attorney for a defendant in some instances
renders judgment against the defendant void).
86. See Magrum, 38 N.W.2d at 361; see also Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d at 611 (holding that the
choice was not free and responsible because the defendant did not refuse counsel).
87. See Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d at 611; see also Stone v. State, 171 N.W.2d 119, 127 (N.D. 1969)
(stating that a court must adduce and determine from the facts whether there was an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel).
88. See O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d at 863.
89. Id. Before an accused is asked whether or not he or she desires the aid of counsel, he or she
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The North Dakota Supreme Court's Application of the
Waiver Standard

There are three major cases in North Dakota that have served as
guides to determine whether a waiver is intentional. 9 0 First, in State v.
Magrum,9 1 a 1949 case, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
defendant did not freely and understandingly waive his right to assis92
tance of counsel even though he refused the assistance of counsel.
Magrum was taken into custody and held incommunicado by the
sheriff in connection with the murder of Carl Wilson. 9 3 Magrum was not
allowed to communicate with his family or to inform them of his
arrest.9 4 In addition, he was not given an opportunity to find, whether on
his own or with the help of others, assistance of counsel. 9 5 On the
evening he was arrested, Magrum was taken before the magistrate and
96
charged with first degree murder.
Magrum was apparently promised that if he pled guilty to murder,
his sentence would be light. 9 7 Based upon this apparent promise, and
after being asked if he would like to hire an attorney, to which he replied
in the negative, Magrum pled guilty. 98 Under these circumstances, the
court found that his choice was "beclouded" by duress, promises, and
misleading advice, compelling the court to order the judgment and
sentence against the defendant vacated.9 9
Likewise, in the 1954 case of State v. Whiteman,lOO the court determined that the defendant did not freely and understandingly waive his
right to counsel.lOl The defendant, a Native-American with only a grade
school education, pled guilty to first degree murder after being beaten
should fist be fully informed of his or her rights. State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242, 250 (N.D. 1970).
To prevent the inquiry about counsel from becoming an idle ceremony devoid of any substance or
purpose, the court listed four inquiries that the trial court needed to make:
1) inform the accused of his right to counsel and of a indigent defendant's right to a court
appointed counsel at public expense; 2) ask the accused if he desires aid of counsel; 3) if
the accused desires counsel, inquire into his financial condition; and 4) if the accused is
financially unable to employ counsel of his own choice, appoint competent counsel to
represent him at the expense of the county.
Id. at 250.
90. Stone, 171 N.W.2d at 127.
91. 38 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1949).
92. State v. Magrum, 38 N.W.2d 358, 366 (N.D. 1949).
93. Id. at 361-66.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 67 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1954).
101. State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599, 610 (N.D. 1954).
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by police officers and repeatedly threatened.1 0 2 In addition to the atmosphere in the police station, there was also an apparent threat of mob
violence that led the defendant to believe that he had no alternative but
to waive counsel and plead guilty.J 03 The court found that the defendant
was compelled to waive counsel through intimidation, threats, and even
violence.1 04 As a result of these subverting factors, the court held that
the defendant had no alternative but to waive counsel, and it accordingly
reversed his conviction. 105
Finally, in State v. O'Neil,106 a 1962 case, the court held that the
defendants failed to prove that they did not waive their right to assistance
of counsel in a free and understanding manner. 107 The court found no
evidence of inducement and coercion. 108 Rather, the defendants pled
guilty after repeatedly telling the court that they did not desire an
attorney. 109

In O'Neill, the court found that the fact that the defendants signed
written confessions reciting details of the crimes charged with no evidence of inducement or coercion, coupled with the fact the defendants
repeatedly refused counsel, indicated an understanding and intelligent
choice to waive counsel. 1 10 Thus, the court found that the defendants'
responses indicated an understanding of the questions asked by the
court which amounted to an intelligent and understanding waiver of
counsel." 11
2. The "Functional" Waiver
The court has also found that defendants may make "functional"
waivers of their rights. In State v. Harmon,112 the defendant argued that
he did not waive his right to assistance of counsel because the trial court
failed to advise him of the dangers of proceeding pro se and because the
record showed no "unequivocal statements" by him indicating a desire
102. Id. at 600-07.
103. Id. at 602-07.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 117 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1962).
107. State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857, 863 (N.D. 1962).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also State v. Gustafson, 278 N.W.2d 358, 362-63 (N.D. 1979) (holding that the defendants' silence reflected an intelligent waiver based upon the actions and responses of defendants'
in both the pre-trial and trial settings); State v. Heasely, 180 N.W.2d 242, 247, 250 (N.D. 1969) (holding that the defendant's appearance on his own behalf was involuntary and therefore he did not
intelligently and understandingly waive his rights).
112. 1997 N.D. 233, 571 N.W.2d 815.
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to proceed pro se. 113 Justice Sandstrom, writing for the court, concluded
that counsel was made available to Harmon and that he was made aware
of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation," thereby
indicating that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
representation.1 14 The court consequently reaffirmed past precedent by
stating that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and requires that
the defendant be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation so the record establishes that the defendant knows
what he or she is doing and his or her choice is made with open eyes."l 5
Harmon had claimed he had a conflict of interest and an irreconcilable difference on trial strategy with his court-appointed counsel.' 1 6 The
trial court initially denied the defendant's request to appoint substitute
counsel, but Harmon continued to request appointment of substitute
counsel."i 7 Finally, the trial court relieved Harmon's appointed counsel
of actively representing him but required counsel to appear in a stand-by
role. 1 1 8 At trial, Harmon initially represented himself, but he later
allowed stand-by counsel to participate.119
The court ruled that Harmon's refusal of services of appointed
counsel and his continued request for substitute counsel was the "functional" 120 equivalent of a waiver of the right to counsel that was knowing
113. State v. Harmon, 1997 N.D. 233, 15, 571 N.W.2d 815, 819.
114. Id. 23, 571 N.W.2d at 822. Harmon was charged with gross sexual imposition, felonious
restraint, and terrorizing. Id. 2, 571 N.W.2d at 817.
115. Id. 22, 571 N.W.2d at 821.
116. Id. 12, 571 N.W.2d at 817.
117. Id. 4-5, 571 N.W.2d at 817-18; see State v. Klein, 1997 N.D. 25, 1 22, 560 N.W.2d 198,
202 (stating that the matter of substitution of appointed counsel is committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court and, absent a showing of good cause for the substitution, a refusal to substitute is not an
abuse of discretion); State v. Foster, 1997 N.D. 8, 14, 560 N.W.2d 194, 197 (stating that "[a]bsent a
showing of good cause to justify defendant's request for substitution of counsel, a trial court's refusal
to grant such a request is not an abuse of discretion").
118. Harmon, 5, 571 N.W.2d at 817; see Carey v. State of Minnesota, 767 F.2d 440, 441-42
(8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (stating that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute fight to counsel of his or her own choosing); State v. DuPaul, 527 N.W.2d 238, 241 (N.D. 1997) (ruling that an
indigent defendant has no right to appointed counsel of his or her choosing).
119. Harmon, IN 6-7, 571 N.W.2d at 818; see State v. Hart, 1997 N.D. 188, 7, 569 N.W.2d 451,
454 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 456 U.S. 168 (1984) in elaborating on the role of stand-by counsel).
120. See United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1391 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that the choice
between finishing trial with admittedly competent counsel or proceeding pro se did not deny defendant
right to counsel); Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that appellant's decision to seek the removal of his appointed counsel, after being cautioned that no replacement would be
appointed, was the functional equivalent of voluntary waiver of his right to counsel in the sense that it
was not a waiver forced upon him); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to proceed with able counsel without good cause is a voluntary waiver); United States v. Sarsoun,
834 F.2d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that failure to cooperate with court implied waiver of the
right to counsel); United States v. Grosshans, 821 F.2d 1247, 1251 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that defendant knowingly waived the right to counsel when she refused to obtain an attorney, intended to
represent herself, and was aware of the disadvantages of self-representation, as evidenced by numer
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and intelligent because Harmon's conduct demonstrated that he was
aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation."121
The court made this determination based on the following facts: 1) Harmon had several previous contacts with the criminal justice system; 2)
Harmon was made aware that he would not be given special consideration in matters concerning the rules of the court; 3) Harmon was very
involved with the case, was literate, and directed correspondence to the
court; and 4) Harmon rejected his appointed counsel but would ask for
assistance from stand-by counsel at times during his trial. 122 In light of
these considerations, the court concluded that Harmon was aware of the
123
"dangers and disadvantages of self-representation."
In so holding, the court stated that although lack of a specific
on-the-record determination is not necessarily fatal, trial courts should
be careful to make specific, on-the-record determinations about whether
a defendant unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or
her right to counsel. 124 Therefore, while Harmon's decision to represent
himself may have been an error in judgment, this error did not foreclose
his decision to waive counsel from being knowing and intelligent.12 5
III. CASE ANALYSIS
Writing for the court, Chief Justice VandeWalle explained that Wicks
did not waive her right to counsel and was thereby denied her right to
counsel under Article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution and
ous motions filed pro se); Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that a
defendant's persistent requests to represent himself constituted a knowing, voluntary, and unequivocal
waiver of his right to counsel); McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that defendant's insistence that counsel be removed was the functional equivalent of a knowing
and intelligent waiver of counsel); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that defendant's persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new
counsel was the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Mckee v.
Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 934 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that since good cause did not exist for assignment of
new counsel, defendant's failure to choose between alternatives presented by the trial judge constituted a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver); Wilks v. Isreal, 627 F.2d 32, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1980)
(finding that when the defendant did not like his appointed counsel but did not want to proceed pro se
after trial judge gave him the choice of the two alternatives, failing to make a choice constituted a
voluntary and knowing waiver of counsel); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.
1980) (finding that defendant's refusal to hire a lawyer constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right to assistance of counsel); United States v. Brown, 591 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding
that defendant's persistence in refusing to accept any counsel except that of his own choosing and this
insistence on proceeding pro se could only be construed as a knowing and intelligent waiver).
121. Harmon, T 19-21, 571 N.W.2d at 820-21; see United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 642
(7th Cir. 1989) (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver even though "the record shows that the defendant never clearly stated that he waived his right to counsel [and] on several occasions the defendant
insisted that he was being forced to proceed pro se by the court and would have preferred to have
new counsel appointed").
122. Harmon, 23, 571 N.W.2d at 822.
123. Id.
124. Harmon, 23 n.1, 571 N.W.2d at 822 n.l.
125. Id. 1 23, 571 N.W.2d at 822 (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993)).
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the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 126 The court held that the record in this case revealed that Wicks
was compelled to represent herself in the criminal trial by the convergence of four events: 1) the filing of the disciplinary complaint; 2) the
subsequent withdrawal of her appointed attorney; 3) her inability to
secure other representation; and 4) the trial court's refusal to grant a
127
continuance.
Although the filing of the disciplinary complaint was the catalyst
for what followed, the court found that it was apparent from the record
that the "forced waiver" was not made with an awareness of the "dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation. 128 Hence, Wicks did not
make a knowing choice to represent herself, because she unwittingly
created a conflict of interest with her attorney which caused him to
withdraw.129
The court found that this case marked a unique contrast from its
decision in Harmon, in that Harmon claimed he had irreconcilable differences with his appointed counsel and repeatedly requested newly appointed counsel. 130 The court concluded that Harmon had functionally
waived his right to counsel because counsel was made available and
Harmon was aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." 13 1 Unlike Harmon, Wicks was willing to proceed with her
appointed attorney and was not aware of the consequences of filing a
disciplinary complaint.132 The district court believed the conflict compelled it to allow the withdrawal of Wicks' appointed attorney, which in
turn compelled the trial court to force Wicks to proceed pro se. 133
Despite the conflict of interest created by Wicks' filing of the disciplinary complaint, the court ruled that, on the face of the record, such a
conflict was not irreparable. 134 The court did recognize that this case
placed Martin's ethical obligation to his client at odds with the client's
Sixth Amendment right to representation at trial.135 But the court was
more troubled by the implication that the disciplinary complaint was
used as a "sword" to delay and frustrate the judicial process.1 36
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

State v. Wicks, 1998 N.D. 76, 29, 576 N.w.2d 518, 522.
Id. 18, 576 N.W.2d at 520-21.
Id. 1 18, 576 N.W.2d at 521.
Id. 19.
Id. 21.
Id. (citing State v. Harmon, 1997 N.D. 233, 17, 571 N.W.2d 815, 817).
Id. 122.
Id.
Id.
Id. 123.
Id. (citing Neal v. Grammar, 975 F.2d 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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The Court examined Rule 1.7 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conductl 3 7 as part of its discussion of the implications of the
conflict of interest created by the filing of the disciplinary complaint.13 8
The court looked to the comment to Rule 1.7 that notes that paragraphs
a) and b) address situations in which "the lawyer is absolutely prohibited
from undertaking or continuing representation of the client."1 39 However, the court pointed to the comment to Rule 1.7, which instructs that
paragraph c) addresses the situation in which the lawyer's own interest or
responsibilities to another client or third person might adversely affect
the representation of the client. 14 0 In such a situation, the lawyer may
still undertake representation of the client if the lawyer reasonably
believes there will be no adverse effect and the client consents to
continued representation.' 4 '
Further, the court noted that while there are many reasons for a
valid disciplinary complaint to be filed against an attorney, many other
complaints are dismissed because they are groundless.142 Consequently,
the court believed that if the filing of a disciplinary complaint could stop
the prosecution of a criminal defendant, the administration of justice
would come to a halt. 143 As the court was quick to point out, a disciplinary complaint against an appointed attorney cannot be used as an
instrument to create an irreconcilable conflict of interest to delay and
frustrate the judicial process.144
137. N.D. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.7 (a)-(c) (1999). The rule states:
Rule 1.7. Conflicts of interest: general rule
a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's ability to consider, recommend,
or carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will be adversely affected by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's
own interests.
b) A lawyer shall not represent a client when the lawyer's own interests are likely to
adversely affect the representation.
c) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client might be
adversely affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests unless:
1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected;
and
2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in
a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involve.
Id.
138. Wicks, 1 23, 576 N.W.2d at 521; see N. D. R. PROF. CoNDucT 1.7 (a)-(c) (delineating three
separate and distinct conflict of interest situations).
139. Wicks, 24, 576 N.W.2d at 522.
140. Id. (citing N.D. R. PROF. CoNDUCT 1.7 cmt. (1999)).
141. Id.
142. Id. 1 25 (citing ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NORTh DAKOTA JUDICIAL SYSTM 30 (1996)).
143. Id.
144. Id. The court cited Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Brakke, 512 N.W.2d 718, 720 (N.D.
1994), in which the court held that the fact that the trial judge was being sued by the party in the
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The court recognized that when a continuance is sought to retain or
replace counsel, the right to select counsel must be balanced against the
public's interest in the orderly administration of justice.I4 5 The court
found that in such cases, trial courts have the discretion to determine
whether or not to grant a continuance. 14 6 Therefore, in exercising its
discretion, the trial court may consider the time required and permitted
47
for trial preparation and the diligence of the moving party.1
The court found that when the trial court became aware of the
disciplinary complaint, even if the trial court did not want to grant a
continuance, it still had a variety of other options at its disposal that it
should have explored.14 8 For instance, the court stated, considering
Wicks' expectation and willingness to proceed with Martin as her attorney, the trial court could have denied Martin's request for withdrawal
and proceeded to trial.14 9 The court may also have considered whether
Martin and Wicks would have been willing to go to trial with Martin as
stand-by counsel.150 If neither of these options were satisfactory, the
trial court could have allowed Martin to withdraw and, as a last resort,
pending action did not require recusal because doing so would allow litigants to eliminate
unsatisfactory judges merely by suing them. Id.
145. Id. 26 (citing Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Linton v.
Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981)). The absence of counsel in a criminal case may entitle the
defendant to a continuance. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Continuance § 82 (1990). However, in order to obtain a
continuance, the defendant must show that the absence was attributable to some unforeseeable cause.
Id. Therefore, a continuance may be denied when counsel's absence is brought about by some act or
omission on the part of the accused. Id.
146. Wicks, 26, 576 N.W.2d at 522; see State v. Foster, 1997 N.D. 8, 14, 560 N.W.2d 194,
197 (noting distrust of appointed counsel is not sufficient to secure a substitution); State v. DuPaul, 527
N.W.2d 238, 243 (N.D. 1995) (stating the "trial court has no duty to appoint a specific counsel, or to
continually seek new counsel for a capricious and difficult defendant"); see also United States v.
Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a federal district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a defendant's request for a continuance and substitution of counsel where the relationship with counsel, although not meaningful, did not reflect irreconcilable conflict). While trial courts
do have considerable discretion in granting a continuance, their discretion is somewhat limited by the
Sixth Amendment. 17 AM. JUR. 2d Continuance § 83. However, the accused's right to select his or her
counsel cannot be manipulated in order to obstruct the orderly procedure for trials or to interfere with
the administration of justice. Id.
147. Wicks, 27, 576 N.W.2d at 522 (citing United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir.
1989)); see also Urquhart,726 F.2d at 1319 (holding that trial court did not violate a prisoners Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in denying a request for a continuance when the question of a continuance was not presented until the day of trial). For a general discussion of a trial court's discretion
in granting continuances in criminal trials and the circumstances surrounding when a motion for
continuance can be granted or denied, see 17 AM. JUR. 2D Continuance §§ 82-88.
148. Wicks, 28, 576 N.W.2d at 522.
149. Id.
150. Id., 576 N.W.2d at 522-23; see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-83 (1984)
(defining the role of the stand-by counsel and imposing two limits on stand-by counsel's unsolicited
participation: I) the defendant must be entitled to preserve actual control over the case presented to
the jury, and 2) stand-by counsel's participation must not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception
that the defendant is representing himself); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)
(recognizing that a defendant's right to self-representation is not a license to abuse dignity of the
courtroom and that the court may appoint "stand-by counsel" to aid the accused).
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granted a continuance to allow Wicks the opportunity to arrange for new
counsel. 15 1
Instead of exploring these options, the trial court, believing in the
existence of an irreparable conflict, allowed Martin to withdraw and
forced Wicks to proceed pro se. 15 2 Under the facts of this case, the court
held that Wicks did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to
counsel.1 5 3 Therefore, the actions of the trial court were a denial of
Wicks' right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the North
Dakota Constitution. 154 Accordingly, the court reversed Wicks' conviction and remanded the case for a disposition consistent with the court's
opinion.155
IV. IMPACT
Shortly after its decision in Wicks, the North Dakota Supreme Court
decided another case in which a defendant asserted that he was denied
his right to counsel. 156 In State v. Poitra,157 the court held that although
an indigent defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel of his or her
choice,158 the record before it did not establish that the trial court explored other options for the defendant's representation. 159 Therefore,
the court declined to equate the defendant's request for removal of
court-appointed counsel and his later inability to hire counsel to the
functional equivalent of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.160
The effect of the Harmon-Wicks-Poitra line of cases on North
Dakota law is articulated in the concurring opinion of Justice Sandstrom
in Poitra, in which he declared that the decision reached in Harmon
should not be read as eliminating the need for a defendant to request
151. Wicks, 1 28, 576 N.W.2d at 523.
152. Id. " 28-29.
153. Id. 1 19, 576 N.W.2d at 521.
154. Id. 1 29, 576 N.W.2d at 523.
155. Id.. 30. On remand, Johannah Wicks, represented by Brenda A. Neubauer, pled guilty and
was sentenced to one year in jail with six months suspended and was given credit for six months
served. State v. Wicks, Cr. No. 96-K-3451 (judgment Sept. 4, 1998). Wicks was also placed on
probation for 18 months. Id.
156. State v. Poitra, 1998 N.D. 88, 6, 578 N.W.2d 121, 123. Defendant Linus Poitra wrote the
trial court in June 1997 stating that he no longer wanted the services of his appointed counsel because
he felt counsel was unqualified. Id. 1 3, 578 N.W.2d at 122. Poitra tried to hire his own attorney but
did not have enough money to obtain one. Id. 4. At trial, the court noted that Poitra was representing
himself and made no further inquiry about his self-representation. Id. 5, 578 N.W.2d at 123.
157. 1998 N.D. 88, 578 N.W.2d 121.
158. State v. Poitra, 1998 N.D. 88, 1 13, 578 N.W.2d 121, 124 (citing State v. Foster, 1997 N.D. 8,
14, 560 N.W.2d 194).
159. Id. (citing State v. Wicks, 1998 N.D. 76, 1 28, 576 N.W.2d 518).
160. Id.
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self-representation unequivocally and for the trial court to determine
whether a defendant's unequivocal request is knowing and intelligent.161
Indeed, it is clear that a waiver of the right to counsel must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right which must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience and conduct of
the accused.1 62 In addition, the North Dakota Supreme Court has long
held that a valid waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record. 163
Instead, the record must show that an accused was offered counsel but
intelligently and understandingly rejected such an offer. 16 4 Therefore,
Harmon's recognition of a "functional" waiver should be limited to
situations in which a defendant refuses to choose between the right to
65
counsel and the right to self-representation.1
The persuasive impact of the decision in Wicks reaffirms that a trial
court must establish on the record that a defendant's "waiver" of counsel was knowing and intelligent, requiring awareness of the "dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation."1 6 6 Accordingly, even though the
decision to grant a continuance remains within the discretion of the trial
court, the Wicks decision directs trial courts to explore other options
before allowing appointed counsel to withdraw, thereby forcing a defendant to proceed pro se before determining whether the defendant truly
understands the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.1 6 7
Brad R. Kolling

161. State v. Poitra, 1998 N.D. 88, TI 16-19, 578 N.W.2d 121, 124-5 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
162. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
163. State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857, 863 (N.D. 1962).
164. Id.; see Stone v. State, 171 N.W.2d 119, 127 (N.D. 1969) (stating that a court must adduce
and determine from the facts whether an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of right to counsel
had taken place); State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599, 611 (N.D. 1954) (holding that the choice to
waive counsel was not free and responsible because the defendant did not refuse counsel).
165. Poitra, 18, 578 N.W.2d at 125. Poitra tried to hire his own attorney but did not have
enough money to obtain one. Id. 1 4, 578 N.W.2d at 122. At trial, the court noted that Poitra was
representing himself and made no further inquiry about his self-representation. Id. 5, 578 N.W.2d at
123. Likewise Wicks had sought to obtain her own attorney but still intended to go to trial with Martin
even after filing the disciplinary complaint, the consequences of which she did not comprehend. State
v. Wicks, 1988 N.D. 76, 122, 576 N.W.2d 518, 521. The trial court believed the conflict compelled it
to grant the withdrawal motion and proceeded to force Wicks to represent herself without inquiring
into any other options aside from self-representation. Id. IN 22-29.
166. See Wicks, 1 18, 576 N.W.2d 520-21.
167. See id. fI 23-29, 576 N.W.2d at 521-23; Poitra,1 12, 578 N.W.2d at 124.

